The W(D) decision matters. As a paradigm of the core principles of fundamental justice, W(D) has empowered the credibility assessment and given it meaning. From its release in 1991, the essence of the decision, invoked by the case initials, reverberated through the appellate and trial courts and changed the legal landscape. From its modest beginnings as an admonishment to beware of the impermissible "credibility contest," W(D) radically transformed the everyday to the infra-ordinary by imbedding the presumption of innocence and the inextricably connected reasonable doubt standard into the decision-making analysis. But the revolutionary path has not been easy as the courts struggle with the tension between the "ideal" and the "real." Yet, W(D) has survived this ordeal to become an essential trial concept. How W(D) has made this not-so "magical" transition is discussed in this article as we trace the impact of the decision through statistics, case law, the judicial lens and the personal perspective. At the end of this examination, we will see W(D) anew; not as a worn-out overplayed "mantra" but as an invigorating principle representing the plurality of what is at stake in a criminal trial. To apply W(D) is to know it. This article attempts that very task.
I. EXPLAINING THE REVOLUTION: WHY W(D) STILL MATTERS n the 1991 Supreme Court decision of R v W(D)
, Justice Cory proposed a simple three-step instruction to the jury on the "question of credibility" as follows:
First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit. Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit. Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. Since then, the decision has been considered an astounding 9,137 times. 3 To this day, the principles enshrined in the decision are readily identifiable by mere mention of the case initials. 4 But, does this iconic status ensure the staying power of the W(D) principle, which is synonymous with applying the reasonable doubt standard to the credibility assessment in a criminal trial?
The answer to this question depends on our perception and understanding of the impact of the decision. On one view, the iconic reputation and representation of the case detracts from its potential importance as a legal principle. Iconography begets simplification. With simplification, the case becomes a mere representation of an ideal, resulting in the dilution of the core meaning of the W(D) instruction. This flattening out of W(D), instead of being a vehicle for widely disseminating the underlying message, has the potential to weaken those very same principles of fundamental justice it attempts to protect. The other view, advanced in this article, is that W(D) is revolutionary. This provocative view recognizes the extraordinary and lasting impact W(D) is continuing to have on the criminal justice system. W(D) has created a revolutionary paradigm shift 1 away from its early conception as a warning to the trier of fact to refrain from making a "choice between two alternatives" 5 in assessing opposite narratives. This shift has transformed W(D) into a robust and sophisticated analytical decision-making tool embedded in our principles of fundamental justice. It is the contention of this article that the W(D) principle is key to the integrity of our criminal justice system. W(D) must be embraced and celebrated, not derided and discarded.
I set this challenge to discover the true essence of W(D) as a multidimensional five-part journey in which we interact with the impact of W(D) through a variety of interpretive modes from the historic to the juridical. 
II. THE "WINNER" TAKES ALL: ASSESSING CREDIBILITY PRE-W(D)
As a criminal defence appellate lawyer practicing in the late eighties to early nineties, the W(D) decision was a vindication of what we appellate lawyers already knew; that credibility assessment could potentially strain the metaphorical golden thread of the presumption of innocence. Even before the watershed moment offered by Justice Cory in W(D), we argued appeals based on the forbidden temptation by the trier of fact to enter into a "credibility contest" in assessing credibility. This erroneous approach denied the "legitimate possibility" 6 that the trier of fact could not choose the 'winner' and was thus left in a state of reasonable doubt. By choosing sides, the trier effectively reversed the burden of proof, necessitating the accused present the stronger or more persuasive case.
In the days before Justice Cory's sage advice on how to deal with such an issue, we relied on two Ontario Court of Appeal decisions, R v Challice 7 and R v Nimchuk, 8 to make our case. Particularly useful was Justice Martin's decision in Nimchuk, which connected general credibility assessment principles to the specific testimonial concern arising from the presentation of two conflicting versions of the events. Justice Martin articulates the issue, reminiscent of W(D), by suggesting three possible assessment alternatives in paragraph 7 involving:
In our view, the trial judge in concluding that in order to acquit the appellant he would have to find that Mrs. Vanka was "framing him", in effect, placed the burden of proof upon the appellant. The trial judge appeared to think that he was confronted with a choice between two alternatives, either accepting the evidence of the accused, and finding that Mrs. Vanka framed him, or accepting the evidence of Mrs. Vanka, which required a conviction. There was, of course, a third alternative, namely, if a reasonable doubt existed, in view of the conflicting testimony, as to exactly where the truth of the matter lay, it would, of course, require an acquittal. 9 While the error in Nimchuk resulted in a new trial, the Court in Challice, after carefully reviewing the charge as a whole, found the jury would fully understand "their duty with respect to the burden and standard of proof" 10 despite the trial judge's direction to "decide whose version you are going to accept."
11
This consideration of the entire charge in determining the efficacy of this error becomes part of a greater willingness to look at errors contextually. Later, this holistic approach is used as a prophylactic against other grounds of appeal, such as those errors relating to the misapprehension of the evidence, unreasonable verdict, and the more general burden of proof or Lifchus 12 errors. Due to the influence of Challice 13 and Nimchuk, cases from the pre-W(D) era tended to view the issue as either a "credibility contest" 14 or a "choice between two alternatives."
15
Better yet, was the use of the phrase "stark choice" 16 or "stark alternatives," 17 to describe the magnitude and polarity of the error as characterized by Justice Morden in Challice. 18 It is therefore disconcerting to read the 1992 British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in R v CP 19 suggesting that "in fairness to the learned trial judge, it must be recognized that he delivered this charge before the judgments in R v (W)D and R v H(C), and we have no doubt juries will henceforth be instructed that reasonable doubt applies to credibility when it is in issue." where the Appellant was charged with first-degree murder but convicted by a jury of second-degree murder. According to Justice Lamer, the trial judge erred in his instruction on the standard of proof as he imperatively directed the jury, as excerpted on page 573, to:
[C]hoose the more persuasive, the clearer version the one which provides a better explanation of the facts, which is more consistent with the other facts established in the evidence. You must keep in mind that, as the accused has the benefit of the doubt on all the evidence, if you come to the conclusion that the two (2) versions are equally consistent with the evidence, are equally valid, you must give -you must accept the version more favourable to the accused. These are the principles on which you must make your choice between the two (2) versions.
26
This instruction was squarely within the identifiable error in W(D). Moreover, the accused, according to Justice Lamer, has the "benefits from any reasonable doubt at the outset," 27 while the onus to prove that case continually rests on the prosecutor until the final decision on guilt or innocence. This concept was so basic that Nadeau cites no case law in support of allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial. Nadeau was cited in W(D) and still has traction as a directive case for a trial judge in assessing credibility.
28
Nadeau was also cited in two high profile murder appeals later in that decade; R v Thatcher considered the Nadeau error. In the Thatcher case, the error was characterized as an improper instruction to the jury to choose between the Crown and defence evidence "thereby reducing the burden of proof."
31
The court also considered whether such an error could be "cured" by s. 613(1(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code 32 (now s. 686(1)(b)(iii)) permitting an appellate court to dismiss an appeal where there is no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. In Nadeau, the court declined to apply the section as the verdict would not necessarily be the same. 33 However, in Thatcher, the proviso was applied resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. As in Challice, the error in Thatcher, when viewed within the context of the charge, essentially disappears.
34
The Morin decision, as a ground of appeal advanced by the Crown, affords us a different perspective of the issue. Here, the Crown argued the standard of reasonable doubt must be applied to the whole of the evidence, not as a "piecemeal" application to individual pieces of evidence. Although Justice Sopinka generally agreed evidence should be considered as a whole in determining the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused, exceptions could be found in the duty of the trial judge to give appropriate direction in vital areas, such as credibility assessments. This position is exemplified in the later Supreme Court decision in R v MacKenzie 35 where the credibility assessment involved a contradiction between the accused's out of court statement and his evidence at trial.
31
Thatcher, supra note 29 at 700.
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Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 33 This "test" derives from the common law as articulated in Makin v Att. Gen. for New South Wales, [1894] AC 57 at 70 and approved of in Canada as early as Allen v The King, 44 SCR 331, 18 CCC 1, Fitzpatrick CJC (considered whether the error was "an irregularity so trivial" to not amount to a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice at 334). Another early version of the "test" can be found in Brooks v The King, [1927] SCR 633 at 636, 1 DLR 268 ("onus was upon the Crown to satisfy the Court that the jury, charged as it should have been, could not, as reasonable men, have done otherwise than find the appellant guilty"). Subsequent cases such as R v Bevan, [1993] 2 SCR 599 at 616-617, 1993 CanLII 101 have refined this "curative provision" to whether "the verdict would necessarily have been the same if such error had not occurred."
The Morin position is consistent with the depiction of the trial judge assisting the jury through the "judicial lens" of experience in complex and crucial areas of the evidence. Even at this early stage, what became known as the W(D) instruction is viewed as an important part of the discourse between the trial judge, learned in the law, and the jury of peers as finders of the facts. In this way, W(D) can be viewed as the bridge between fact and law and as epitomizing the relationship the judge has with the jury during a trial. This relationship, through the charge or instructions to the jury, does not end in the bounded space of the courtroom but remains throughout the jury deliberations.
As an additional wrinkle to our pre-W(D) survey is the connection between credibility assessment and other legal principles circumscribed at that time. A good example of this is found in R v Corbett 37 which considered the admissibility of bad character evidence in the form of a criminal record. This decision created the Corbett application in which a voir dire is required to determine the admissibility of an accused's criminal record in circumstances where the accused will testify. It is in the dissent of Justice LaForest where the wider implications of the Challice ground can be observed. Justice LaForest outlines several factors in exercising the discretion to exclude, which still inform the Corbett application. As part of this discussion, Justice LaForest mentions the problematic situation of when the case "boils down to a credibility contest" 38 and the "fair trial" desire to put before the jury the record of all parties in making the credibility assessment.
39
Justice LaForest references two lines of authority emanating from American case law. One view, as found in Gordon v United States, 40 suggests the criminal record is highly probative "for exploring all avenues which would shed light on which of the two witnesses was to be believed." by distracting the jury from the evidence and inviting them to enter into the impermissible inference that as the accused acted wrongly in the past he must be guilty now. 44 Justice LaForest took a truly Canadian view by favouring a case-by-case contextual approach where credibility instances could not "override the concern for a fair trial."
45
There are two items to consider from this dissent. First, there appears to be a disjunct between the caution against entering into a 'credibility contest' and the manner in which trial evidence is actually presented. There is a telling gap between the enunciated principle and the trial realities where narratives unfold like every day events. Certainly, in the American decision of Gordon v United States, the Court considered credibility as a question of whom to believe. We will explore this dichotomy further in this article but even before W(D) swept onto the precedential stage, the courts were struggling with the application of reasonable doubt and the differences between 'accepting or rejecting' evidence and 'choosing' one type of evidence over another. Second, Corbett underlines the important concept of trial fairness, which is engaged by credibility assessments. Trial fairness, as a principle of fundamental justice, permeates W(D) and yet is not given due deference in the W(D) trope. Both concepts of trial reality and trial fairness will inform the W(D) Revolution.
III. CONSTRUCTING THE W(D) REVOLUTION

A. Creating W(D): Introduction
Typically, a methodology that employs deconstruction attempts to break down hidden assumptions found in a concept by reducing it to its constituent parts as a method of reinterpretation. But the utilization of this methodology in understanding W(D) seems counterintuitive considering the appellate courts shun this approach when the W(D) error is raised on appeal. The concept of "cherry-picking" 46 or parsing a charge or reasons of a trial judge is a stock derisive criticism on appeal. In the courts' view, breaking down a trial judge's work product results in reductio ad absurdum, where the few lines of error are given greater weight than should be apportioned considering the context of the entire case. In law, context is everything.
Yet, up to this point, we have deconstructed W(D) without knowing it. We have traced the W(D) concept through its pre-history and found the core meaning of the W(D) instruction is about choices or rather, about keeping the reasonable doubt mind open to making none. We have also found a golden thread woven in between these choices and that makes all the difference. Credibility assessment, indeed assessing the whole evidential landscape, is imbued with our principles of fundamental justice grounded in the proper application of the presumption of innocence as articulated by the burden on the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It also engages the gatekeeper function of the trial judge to ensure trial fairness. The pre-W(D) case law situates this concept in the testimonial arena where credibility is key. These cases offer a scenario easiest to visualize, the complainant and the accused giving diametrically opposed versions of the events. We can easily see in that vivid picture the ease of committing the Nimchuk error; to believe the accused is to find that the complainant "framed" the accused.
However, Nadeau, Thatcher, and Morin decisions tell us a more expansive story which is not limited by sides; those cases are speaking to the very heart of the criminal law through the burden on the Crown to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. How W(D) weighs into this fray is not a question of deconstruction but of construction as W(D) builds on this past case law to create an elegant yet simple framework for the trial judge to use to ensure the evidence is assessed properly and consistently within the core principles of criminal law. But contrary to fiction where we imagine "if we build it, they will come," 47 constructing legal principles is fraught with difficulty. We in law do not simply build from pre-vetted plans, we question and probe while we build and often challenge the plan. 
B. The Building Materials: The Case
To give perspective to this quest, we will first review the backdrop of the case in the broader context of the facts and of the legal landscape of that time. W(D) was charged and convicted of sexual offences involving his teenaged niece. It was, as in the previous cases of Challice and Nimchuk, a trial in which credibility and divergent narratives were at the core of the trial. It was like Challice, a jury trial but, as identified by Justice Cory, it was a situation where the trial judge in his original charge correctly directed on the standard of proof relating to credibility assessment but then erred in the recharge to the jury. 48 The issue was one of quantum and reversible error. In the lower appellate court, the Ontario Court of Appeal was divided and, in the Supreme Court, that divisiveness on the impact or effect of the error would remain. This impact question would become the main thrust of future appeals on the thereafter named W(D) error.
But first some socio-legal context. W(D) was heard on February 1, 1991 and released weeks later, on March 28, 1991. The panel of five consisted of Justices Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, and Iacobucci. Justice Sopinka, who dissented in the decision, was the longest sitting justice having been appointed May 24, 1988. Justice Iacobucci was the newcomer having been appointed less than a month previously on January 7, 1991. Historically, the late 1980s to mid-1990s were turbulent times in the Supreme Court: these were heady days of criminal law where the highest court struggled with core elements of criminal offences such as in the subjective/objective mens rea debate raging through a series of cases on the fault element of murder, manslaughter, criminal negligence, dangerous driving, and sexual assault. 49 Connected to this debate was the related issue of offences which purportedly reversed the burden of proof onto the accused. discussed in a number of cases and with these amendments were evidential questions of proof, reliability, and credibility, most notably of children.
51
Intoxication and the pro forma categories of general and specific intent were dissected and debated. 52 Although on divergent issues, these cases engaged themes resonating through W(D), such as the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, trial fairness, and the desire to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system from miscarriages of justice. Against the background of these momentous decisions is a divergent court with many split decisions, dissents, and multiple majorities; in short, a fractious court. Notably, Justice Cory was a strong voice in many of these ground-breaking criminal law cases. Justice Sopinka too was instrumental, both as speaking for the Court or as part of the dissenting opinion.
53
Justice Cory, for the majority in W(D), begins the analysis by generously excerpting 54 the charge to the jury; both the error free main charge and the erroneous recharge. By setting out the charge in this fashion, the reader of the decision experiences the charge first-hand and can gauge the effect of it. The trial judge, in the re-charge error, advises the jury that "at the end of the day the core issue to be determined by yourselves is whether you believe the complainant or whether you believe the accused." The excerpt is over three-and-a-half pages. True, but with that intelligence they would also realize that the instructions were contradictory and possibly confusing.
Justice Sopinka's dissent adds a different perspective. His dissent also opens by providing continuity with the past by labelling the issue through the Challice metaphor of an unacceptable tug of war "presented as a contest between the credibility of the complainant and that of the accused." 64 Justice Sopinka carefully summarizes the facts; presenting them vividly but in a manner which feeds into unacceptable myths and stereotypes. 65 He depicts the complainant as a 16-year-old "dropout" living from place to place, who did not "complain of these incidents immediately after despite numerous states, "[i]deally, appropriate instructions on the issue of credibility should be given, not only during the main charge, but on any recharge. A trial judge might well instruct the jury on the question of credibility along these lines." opportunities to do so." 66 Furthermore, she remained in the company of the accused after the event. The accused is described as a "poor witness, uneducated and illiterate."
67
This recitation of the facts is a stark reminder that this was a watershed moment for the Supreme Court in their approach to child witnesses and sexual offences. This is the time when the language of "myths and stereotypes" 68 became part of the court's lexicon and reasoning. Only a few months before W(D), the Court was recognizing the influence of the genderized trope in R v Lavallee.
69
Justice Sopinka takes issue with the standard charge on credibility in which the accused "is in exactly the same position as any other witness as to credibility."
70
Such a "bald statement," 71 in the opinion of Justice Sopinka may lead a jury, without further "elaboration" to fail to appreciate that the assessment of the accused's evidence must be done through the consideration of the whole of the evidence while applying the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
72
In Justice Sopinka's view, credibility was "fundamental" to the final determination of the case and the concept of the burden of proof "the most fundamental rule of the game."
73
A misdirection in the instructions could not be salvaged by a proper charge elsewhere in the instructions. The jury required proper instructions not contradictory ones. To find the jury would understand the task required was "pure speculation" 74 requiring a new trial.
66
Ibid.
67
68
Although, "myths and stereotypes" as a phrase was first used by the Supreme Court by L'Heureux-Dubé J, dissenting in Seaboyer, supra note 51, the phrase was referenced a year earlier in the majority decision of Wilson J in R v Lavallee, [1990] It is worthwhile to step back from these two opinions to consider the language used and the emphasis given to certain concepts. For Justice Sopinka, as he posited in the majority decision of Morin, the burden of proof was "one of the most fundamental rules of the game" 75 and credibility in W(D) was the "fundamental issue."
76
Even the trial judge, in the passage of the instructions where the error was made, recognized that determining credibility "is very fundamental to this trial and that is the very heart in effect is who you are going to believe."
77
On the other hand, Justice Cory found credibility was merely "important" 78 and he gave no special descriptor to the burden of proof. His emphasis was on the "correct and fair" the Supreme Court understood this when they found W(D) was unique to the criminal justice system where credibility was "fundamental" 83 as opposed to the civil system where the standard of proof was merely an offset. Trial fairness encompasses many concepts, some of which do require a balanced view and approach, such as in charging the jury on the positions of the defence and prosecution. However, there is one fundamental concept which defies balance and compromise; that is in the fundamental precepts of presumption of innocence and with it the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This special dimension, attributable only to criminal law, encapsulates complex concepts requiring the deft hand of the trial judge to unravel and reveal in an accessible 'human' manner devoid of legalistic language and incomprehensible terminology. of Appeal suggests in R v Barton, 84 instructions to the jury must be user friendly and understandable, taking meaning and solidity from the trial narrative. Of note, in Barton a W(D) argument was raised.
Reading this "as a whole" 85 it is a wonder that the W(D) decision reached the 'cult status' it did. I suggest it is partially language which caused the initial error but also what brings this case into one of the most used and easily identified decision. A decision readily recognized by its two initials. Justice Cory, as already mentioned, called his three-step model instruction an "ideal" 86 but also a "formula" 87 which if used would avoid the "oftrepeated" 88 error on appeal. The lure of a formulaic solution to an 'oftrepeated' error, part self-serving and part altruistic, is simple to understand but as we will discuss in the next section, even when the Supreme Court disapproved of the formulaic stance W(D) encouraged, the case continued to be the 'star attraction' and the cause celebre of case law.
C. The Nuts and Bolts: There is No Magic in That!
In fact, the courts do not like formulaic instructions that suggest insulation from error. There is no such reality where a stock repetition of an approved instruction results in an error free charge. There is no such magic here. Soon after its release, W(D) becomes imperative, reaching the "must do" pinnacle. The Supreme Court quickly resiles from this heightened state to the 'nice to do' position. It was in 1994 when Justice Cory in R v S(WD) 89 made the 'obvious' even more so when he stated "[o]bviously, it is not necessary to recite this formula word for word as some magic incantation. However, it is important that the essence of these instructions be given." 
93
In G(RM), Justice Cory cautions trial judges that his "helpful" "suggestion" not be "slavishly" adhered to "as a magic incantation."
94
In Lifchus, the suggested charge on reasonable doubt again cautions that the instruction "is not a magic incantation to be repeated word for word" 95 but a "suggested form that would not be faulted if it were used."
96
Even if the form itself is not used, Justice Cory continues to explain that "any form of instruction that complied with the applicable principles and avoided the pitfalls referred to would be satisfactory."
97
Although not a formula, it is a recipe to be followed allowing, of course, for personal taste. Justice Cory, the progenitor of W(D), is speaking to the legal community at page 640 when he reminds us that:
At the outset, it's worth repeating that a jury charge should not be microscopically examined and parsed. There is no such thing as a perfect jury charge. Rather, the directions to the jury must be looked at as a whole to determine if there has been any error. See, for example, R. v. W. (D.).
121
In the next paragraph, Justice Cory reiterates his view that the charge, when read as a whole, is "eminently fair."
122
Later, in the Avetysan decision, Justice Major reminds trial judges they "need not mimic" the W(D) ideal as "the language used to obtain the result" is within their "wide discretion."
123
He further agrees with Justice Cory's assessment in Evans that perfection is not what a trial judge strives for but "adequacy."
124
Indeed, an adequately informed jury and a form of instruction that is "in substantial compliance with the existing law is the sum total of what the appellate court expects from the trial judge."
125
Even so, the court in Avetysan allowed the appeal as there were multiple errors in the charge on reasonable doubt resulting in a departure from "established principles." Ibid.
123
Avetysan, supra note 107 at paras 1, 3.
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Ibid at paras 1, 8, 9, 12. Indeed, Major J characterizes the charge as "adequate" on five occasions in the decision.
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Ibid at para 2.
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Ibid at para 3. circumstances. True, W(D) is about the intersection of credibility and reasonable doubt but I would suggest that virtually every case before the courts would have that general aspect. We live in the adversarial system in which narrative is everything. Perhaps that is the trouble with W(D) and why it continues to pervade case law, albeit in a more seamlessly organic manner. The reality is that in a trial, W(D) is everywhere.
The Alberta Court of Appeal also weighed in on W(D) while dispensing advice to appellate counsel and other appellate courts. For instance, the court in R v Tran remarked that "it is not appropriate to read a trial judge's reasons preciously in a spirit of post-facto fault finding" 134 and "equally, an appeal court is not to 'cherry pick' through reasons in a process of isolating words and phrases from their contexts." 
F. The "Finishing Touches": What W(D) may be
We have seen thus far that W(D) did not create a novel instruction but clarified an already recognized interplay between assessing the credibility of testimonial evidence and the fundamental principles of the burden of proof. Rather, it provided an "ideal formula" that when utilized by the trial judge, could avoid, what became known as, the W(D) error. But it was an ideal with a difference; it was not a "magic incantation," which if not intoned or "mimicked" by the trial judge in a charge resulted in a reversible error. Nor was it a "straitjacket" that incentivized parsing and cherry-picking specific words and phrases of a jury charge to conjure up a persuasive ground of appeal. On the contrary, it is the spirit of W(D) which matters.
This admonishment to take note of content over form is perfectly modelled by Moldaver JA, as he then was, in his majority decision of R v Pintar.
139
In this decision, he muses on the "functional approach" 140 to jury instructions in the context of self-defence, again raising the specter of "magical incantations" in his discussion on what instructions are and are not.
141
As suggested by Justice Moldaver, 142 the "functional approach" necessitates the form of the instruction be accountable to the content. This requires a contextual reading of the charge as a unique expression of the specific issue raised in any given case.
143
No two charges, in other words, should be the same and yet the underlying fundamentals remain the same. Justice Moldaver cautions that the functional approach was neither "novel" nor "radical" but a labelling or calling out of what trial judges did on a regular basis through the giving of instructions to the jury.
The trial judge, as portrayed by Justice Doherty in R v Haughton, 144 is like a tailor creating a bespoke suit from material ready at hand. There should be neither too little nor too much material and the embellishment should be as needed not extemporaneous or shoddy workmanship. Eloquent and elegant are the words that come to mind. In this way, its See also Avetysan, supra note 107, Major J ("[t]rial judges' charges to juries vary. No particular magical incantation is required" and that charging a jury is a matter of "wide discretion" at para 1). trial judge's instructions to the jury must be custom-made for the particular case. Those directions must equip the jury with the law necessary to render its verdict. The scope of the trial judge's legal instructions will depend in large measure on the nature of the evidence adduced and the issues legitimately raised by that evidence. A trial judge should not engage in a far-ranging esoteric discourse on potential applications of legal principles which bear no realistic relationship to the issues raised by the evidence" at 625).
purpose, according to Justice Moldaver in Pintar, is "to relieve against some of the confusion and complexity," 145 and, if done properly, such instructions enable: trial judges to be somewhat more selective and proactive in the formulation of their instruction. It is designed to encourage trial judges to pinpoint the real basis upon which the claim to self-defence rests and communicate that defence to the jury in as clear and comprehensible a fashion as possible.
146
This is in harmony with the recent Barton 147 decision, a plea for clarity in jury instructions requiring an integration of the specific facts of each case with the relevant law. This advice, I suggest, is equally applicable to the W(D) scenario.
It is the plasticity of W(D), therefore, not its immutability, that has defined the oft-quoted passage. W(D) symbolizes a fundamental value yet also provides a platform for further development of the law. It is this organic quality of a legal principle, which defines its staying power and development into iconic status. In the next part, we will follow the blossoming of the W(D) instruction from a simple three-step formula to a complex and robust 'analytical process' connecting and enhancing vital trial concepts. This can be traced through the burgeoning grounds of appeal which rely upon or brush against the W(D) mantra and lends decided richness to appellate decisions. Simultaneously, this transformative ability of W(D) redefines the historical meaning of the decision as case law renames the principles inherent in the case. The old school 'credibility contest' or 'choice between two alternatives' becomes more sophisticated. The emphasis shifts from the interplay between two opposing sides to the heart of the fundamentalism of the instruction -the burden of proof.
IV. THE MAKING OF THE W(D) REVOLUTION
To construct this conceptual transition, W(D) effectively made the past part of the present by leaning into the "stark alternative" error and providing a framework onto which the principle could rest. This framework imagined the W(D) principle as a chameleon, which took on the shape of the case before it in the context of the principles of fundamental justice. 145 Pintar, supra note 139 at 40.
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Barton, supra note 84.
This continuity permitted an enlargement of W(D)
, not a diminishment. This is accomplished by two treatments. First, the W(D) principle is imagined through a sophisticated judicial lens that emphasizes the heart of the principle, the burden of proof. Second, W(D) became a discussion piece woven through more than one ground of appeal, touching upon differing areas of law with the common bond or golden thread of the burden of proof. As a result, this prodigious principle has become a richer and more robust part of our criminal justice nomenclature. In this way, I suggest W(D) is alive and well and reminding trial judges and counsel alike across Canada to take heed of our fundamental values.
A. The W(D) Revolution as Imagined Through the Judicial Lens
The first strand in this shift is the sophistication of the principle as seen through the judicial lens. The best example comes to us from the Ontario courts where the W(D) notion has gone through an inspirational makeover. Instead of describing the principle as a 'credibility contest' or 'stark choice between two alternatives,' the issue is one of "uneven scrutiny" of the burden of proof. In this modern approach to W(D), "balance" and "scrutiny" are the key tropes. Thus, the evidence is no longer signified by which side the evidence emanates, the accused or the prosecutor. Rather, the whole of the evidence requires a calm, reasoned, judge-like examination. Although this examination is connected to the "standard" or "burden" of proof in the criminal sense, the use of the balancing metaphors suggests a balanced standard more akin to the civil balance of probabilities. By employing this language, the courts shift the 
W(D)
concern from the singular assessment of credibility required in a criminal case, which protects the accused through the presumption of innocence, to an equal, not necessarily equitable review. However, this shift is in many ways consistent with Justice Cory's caveat in W(D) that the magnitude of the error must be seen in the light of the whole of the evidence.
Other cases describe the W(D) error in a quantitative manner. Thus, the trial judge errs by employing a "higher standard" of scrutiny in the credibility assessment of the accused, resulting in the reversal of the burden of proof.
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This characterization better reflects the concern with the application of the proper standard and burden of proof. Yet, it is a characterization which moves away from the W(D) instruction as it views the credibility assessment in silos, partitioning the complainant's evidence from the accused's evidence as separate entities. It may also have the unwelcome effect of blurring the lines between how we make everyday assessments of data. In the everyday, we regularly make innate choices between what we accept and do not accept. In the unique space of a criminal case, the decision-maker must consciously turn their mind to employing a special or different standard than the everyday. This specialness surrounding the criminal burden of proof is best viewed as the "infra-ordinary," The word "infra-ordinary" was coined by the French writer, Georges Perec. It describes an "everyday" that is not "ordinary or extraordinary, neither banal nor exotic" but requires us to appreciate what we continually miss in the margins between significant and insignificant. The "infraordinary" leads to a different perspective that requires us to view seemingly ordinary matters in a heightened way. It is not enough to show that a different trial judge could have reached a different credibility assessment, or that the trial judge failed to say something that he could have said in assessing the respective credibility of the complainant and the accused, or that he failed to expressly set out legal principles relevant to that credibility assessment. To succeed in this kind of argument, the appellant must point to something in the reasons of the trial judge or perhaps elsewhere in the record that make it clear that the trial judge had applied different standards in assessing the evidence of the appellant and the complainant. 156 Here, Justice Doherty is attempting to confront the curative proviso by explaining it is not the presence of the error but the magnitude of such error that matters on appeal. In reading this, one is reminded of the outcome of W(D) in which the trial judge clearly erred in his instructions in the recharge yet the court found no substantial error. Justice Doherty in Howe also highlights the presence of deference, which is a key component of maintaining the integrity of the justice system. The application of deference by the appellate courts to issues of fact-finding and to credibility assessment, establishes the parameters of appellate intervention, which work in conjunction with the curative proviso. This deference is also connected to the visual side of the judicial lens, the observations made by the trial judge at the time of trial, as opposed to the written and oral advocacy that typically drives the appellate courts.
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In this context, the concept of the common place maxim of "seeing is believing" is nurtured and rewarded over the written expression of the law.
This mixed messaging confirms the W(D) ground is "difficult." What is apparent is that the "difficulty" of this ground of appeal lies in the inextricable mingling of the character or principled purpose of the W(D) instruction and the narrative landscape of a trial. The interplay of fact and law is so near seamless that the difficulty lies in picking them apart, not "cherry-picking" as the derisive side of this argument can be viewed, but as revealing the parts which make up the whole. The inability to do this adequately, I suggest, may be a direct result of the synergy of what we now label as the W(D) principle. The concepts underlying W(D) are deep within our criminal justice system and are "difficult" concepts to articulate and appreciate and yet are necessary to articulate and appreciate. Credibility assessments in light of the formidable duty to apply the rule of law in the context of those fundamental principles is difficult. But difficult does not mean we turn away from that duty. It means we must be ever cognizant of that duty as we go about applying reason and common sense.
To better understand this shift and how it is viewed through the judicial lens, we will look at two recent exemplar cases from two different provincial appellate jurisdictions: the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in R v Cunningham To best appreciate the impact of these decisions, we will examine these cases through the optics of case law. The CAM case will present us with a thoroughly modern approach, which is illuminated by the line of Concurring with Fish J's dissent are Binnie and Deschamps JJ. The decision was rendered by a seven-member panel and was split 4 to 3. 166 Abella J's majority decision is concurred in by three further Justices.
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CLY SCC, supra note 113 at para 5.
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Ibid at paras 8, 11.
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The WD Revolution 335 of the decision."
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Despite the minority status of Justice Fish's comments, courts have subsequently approved of his comments. The court does, in the same paragraph, reiterate the purpose of W(D) as requiring the trial judge to "direct" his or her "mind" to the ultimate standard of proof. However, in the selfsame paragraph, Justice Charron dismisses the ground, preferring to characterize the "substantive concerns" as a sufficiency of reasons issue. To characterize a burden of proof argument as such does require a preference for form over content.
The JHS In Justice Binnie's view, W(D) is a teachable moment for the jury and a mere "unpacking" of the concept of credibility assessment in the context of the reasonable doubt principle. For Justice Binnie, the difficulty in applying the exact W(D) instruction was in its oversimplification when more complex evidence is before the trier such as exculpatory and inculpatory evidence from the accused. This concern is captured by Binnie J when he suggests W(D) has attained a status of immutability "never claimed for" by the author. According to Justice Binnie, it is the "message" not the package that matters. In JHS, the trial judge "got across the point" Ibid at para 16.
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Ibid. Vuradin, supra note 160 at para 21. This approach, as discussed in this paper, occurred over time but can also be seen in R v Lee, 2010 SCC 52 at para 7, [2010] 3 SCR 99, where the court dismisses the W(D) ground as the trial judge did not err in applying the "reasonable doubt standard."
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Ibid at para 26. 190 This is reminiscent of Rothstein J, dissenting, in JAA, supra note 114 at para 66, where, in dismissing the ground based on W(D), he does so on the basis that the trial judge "kept his eye firmly on the proper standard and burden of proof." produces dissents on the issue. Unsurprisingly then, the Alberta court in Cunningham turned to Vuradin to illuminate the W(D) concern.
Cunningham was rendered "by the court," which consisted of Justices Picard, Watson and the then Justice Brown, who was later elevated to the Supreme Court. Again, the angst of the court in reviewing, yet again, a W(D) issue is evident. In paragraph 14, the court comments on how submissions "essentially rehearse" general arguments on credibility assessment and reasonable doubt. Then, the Court, in paragraph 16, reveals a singular truth concerning W(D) when it states:
Ultimately a trial judge or jury does have to make intellectually valid choices amongst competing evidence. The concern of the law is whether in its reasoning process the trial judge or jury loses sight of the presumption of innocence and the The Court references Justice Duval-Hesler's decision in RJ to distinguish between W(D) concerns invoking "lay juries" and reasons as given by a trial judge. In the Court's view, trial judges are presumed to know the law and deserve deference in their factual findings. This presumption limits appellate intervention to consider whether the lower court's decision was "reasonable."
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Two issues arising from this position require our attention. First, is the underlying warning that W(D) not become a "straightjacket" for appellate courts. This view fits nicely with the courts' protective stance relating to the traditional role of the trial judge as the ultimate arbiter of the facts whose decision-making abilities, as seen through the judicial lens, are to be upheld if reasonably held. The further concept of the "presumption" the judge knows the law, must be tempered by the comments we discussed earlier made by Justice Fish in CLY that "judges may know the law"
Second, is the comment on the realities of decision-making, which implies a trier of fact "does have to make intellectually valid choices amongst 191 Cunningham, supra note 158 at para 16.
Ibid at paras 17-18. 193 Ibid at para 33. This expression is singular considering W(D)'s pedigree as a legal principle requiring the trier of fact to apply the standard of proof to the credibility determination. These comments must be viewed in the proper context: the court was confronted with appellate arguments, both written and oral, interlaced with myths and stereotypes. In CAM, the court needed to be exhaustive in their response.
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CAM is a case demonstrating a court's desire to diffuse an impermissible basis for an appeal that was obscured by W(D). In other words, the court found the appellant's argument to be a thinly veiled attempt to rely upon erroneous beliefs of how a woman should act and react by wrapping it in a W(D)-like package. W(D) is indeed a powerful and fundamentally important concept but must be approached in a manner consistent with the prime objectives of the principle, which is to ensure a just and fair trial consistent with our principles of fundamental justice. The passages in CAM on the issue are written for everyone in the justice system and should be read by all, notably the caution in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the judgment where the court states that: Trial judges have a heavy responsibility to ensure that counsel do not introduce the spectre of such forbidden reasoning into a trial. If that occurs in a jury trial, it should be answered by a timely and appropriate instruction to the jury (see R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 (CanLII) at paras 1, 159-61). In judge-alone trials, judges must not succumb to drinking from such a poisoned chalice in their assessment of credibility. The accused's submission that the complainant's credibility as to her version of events was undermined because it did not conform to some "idealized standard of conduct" (R v CMG, 2016 ABQB 368 (CanLII) at para 60) is unsound. I reject it unequivocally. Credibility determinations must be based on the totality of the evidence, not untested assumptions of a victim's likely behaviour based on myths and stereotypes. 
B. Complexity and Enhancement
The second strand to consider in the W(D) revolutionary shift is the way the principle has become bound up with other grounds of appeal resulting in a richer and more complex principle than originally imagined. W(D) is now a discussion piece woven through more than one ground of appeal, touching upon differing areas of law with the common bond or golden thread of the burden of proof. Reference to some of these connected grounds have already been made earlier in this article, such as the grounds relating to reasonable doubt in unreasonable verdict cases. Other areas offer a more specific connection to W(D) as potential errors in assessing the credibility of evidence, which clash with other evidentiary principles such as, the rule in Ibid at para 8.
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Howe 233 on the difficulties of appellate success on burden of proof issues. It is hardly surprising that the numbers also confirm the almost exclusive use of the case by the defence on appeal. W(D) involves the fundamental trial task, credibility assessment, which is inextricably linked to the most fundamental trial concept, the burden of proof.
Despite these predictable results, the numbers should still give us pause. Does this mean W(D) is an overused and underperforming ground of appeal that makes something out of nothing? Or is it such a complicated legal construct that trial judges regularly engage the ground and provide a foundation for potential appellate correction?
In fact, the reality may have shades of both positions: W(D) is overused because it is such an easy error for a trial judge to make. As discussed earlier in this article, in our everyday lives we encounter narratives like those found on the daily court docket. We are constantly required to assess information from loved ones, friends, and even from those unknown to us. We may base our assessments on several complex factors but in the end, we make a choice as to which narrative we will accept, the kind of choice which can lead to a W(D) error. There is a difference: in the everyday when we accept one version of events over another, we are not in the arena of justice where special protections and considerations are advanced through the principles of fundamental justice. True, trial judges are legal specialists and are required to view the legal world through the "judicial lens," however such a lens is not engaged automatically and must be intentionally looked through as part of the "infra-ordinary." W(D) is such a prolific ground of appeal for that reason as it requires judges to think contrary to the everyday and to assess the evidence through the reasonable doubt lens. This heightened situation requires delicacy of thought, involving the intricate confluence of both fact and law. W(D) is an easy ground of appeal to raise but it is a concept difficult to master in both thought and effect.
W(D) is, in many ways, a personal ground of appeal. It suggests the trial judge not only erred in legal principle but also failed in the judicial sense. Such an error implies a lack of awareness of the most basic concept of criminal law; that of reasonable doubt. A W(D) ground extends beyond the case itself and strikes at the very heart of the criminal justice system by calling into question the integrity of the judicially imposed result. It is a ground premised on a system which has been compromised. Such an error 233 Howe, supra note 152.
has the potential to result in a miscarriage of justice through the missteps of the trial judge alone. Conversely, such an error cannot be lightly indulged. The ground engages the full arsenal of appellate court jurisdictional authority such as deference to the trier of fact, the presumption a trial judge knows the law, the reasonableness of the ultimate outcome, the due consideration of the full context of the case, and the recognition that justice need be fairly dispensed but not perfectly so. It is no wonder then that W(D), as a ground of appeal, is often used yet is rarely successful.
This brief segue into a mere slice of the numeric backdrop does reveal the complexities surrounding the issue, which support the revolutionary and almost incendiary aspect of W(D). On one issue, these provincial appellate numbers do make clear, that W(D) as a ground of appeal laden with the burden of usage and judicial effrontery, will continue to engage appellate courts struggling to comprehend its meaning and place in our justice system. In the end, no matter how the numbers are viewed, the numeric significance of W(D) is remarkable for a decision rendered by a fivepanel court.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The survey of the W(D) Revolution is now complete. The oft-quoted three-step test created by Justice Cory as a guide for trial judge's in assessing credibility has evolved into an immutable reminder of the fundamental principles of criminal law. This evolution is a marker of modernity as credibility assessment has morphed into a sophisticated, complex, and challenging part of the function of the trial judge in a criminal case. This change in tone and complexion of W(D) did not arise easily nor has it been fully embraced. Rather, it has occurred out of the changing role of the trial judge as a gatekeeper and guardian of the core principles underlying our justice system.
The W(D) incantation, although not a "magical" one, serves as a mighty reminder of what is at stake in a criminal trial; the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof on the Crown, the standard of proof beyond 234 Five-member panels have meaning in the appellate arena. In the case of a provincial appellate decision, where three-member panels are the norm, a five-member panel is precedential, as such a panel is needed to re-consider precedent setting decisions from their court or to tackle particularly precedent-setting issues. Conversely, a five-member panel at the Supreme Court may suggest the issue is not of precedential concern. a reasonable doubt, trial fairness and the scrupulous avoidance of miscarriages of justice. W(D) and the oft-quoted "test" is now bound up in these fundamental principles of justice creating a synergy of fact and principle. Its influence cannot and should not be underestimated. In an era where there are calls for re-consideration of the W(D) decision, Yet, the case continues to exist uneasily within the rule of law. On one hand, it articulates a core concept vital to the fair and just administration of justice. On the other, it is considered an over-used behemoth that provokes strong reaction from the appellate courts. It is at once protected and rejected by the courts. It is an ideal but not a perfect one. As reiterated by Justice Cory in Evans, released two years after W(D), "a jury charge should not be microscopically examined and parsed. There is no such thing as a Yet, the desire to "parse" and "examine" is tempting on an issue which lies so close to the heart of the criminal justice system. Miscarriages of justice are real and sadly frequent enough in our justice system that to refrain from "microscopic examination" seems contrary to our responsibilities to our clients and to the law. It is difficult to reconcile the end goal of a fair and just decision with an admonishment by the courts to not take W(D) to the nth degree. W(D) is not merely a mental construct or a state of mind of the decision-maker whose boundaries are defined by legal principles. Rather, W(D) transcends the ordinary as a symbol or a gesture encapsulating all that is our criminal justice system.
What of the premise of this article that W(D) has somehow transcended the banal and revolutionized in three steps the way triers of fact approach and assess evidence? I would suggest the revolution is there in every one of those 9000 cases citing W(D) and in every trial lawyer who stands up to remind the trier of fact that W(D), as the embodiment of the presumption of innocence and the principle of reasonable doubt, is a key component of our criminal justice system. In the end, it is not the presence of W(D) for which we must be ever vigilant, but the absence of justice should we not take W(D) seriously.
